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INTRODUCTION

It is now beyond question that one of the central themes to
emerge from the jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court was a
newfound concern for the prerogative of the states vis-à-vis the
federal government, whether aptly described as “federalism” or
not.1 Whether in the context of federal habeas review of state* Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law. My
thanks to Piper Reiff for inviting me to participate in this preview of the
Supreme Court’s 2010 Term. In the interest of full disclosure, I should note that
I co-authored amicus briefs on behalf of federal courts professors and in support
of the Petitioner at both the certiorari and merits stages in Virginia Office for
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court convictions,2 Congress’s regulatory powers under the
Commerce Clause3 and Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment,4 the meaning and scope of the Tenth Amendment,5
or any number of other doctrinal areas,6 the Supreme Court
under the sixteenth Chief Justice of the United States embraced
a sweeping constitutional vision of states’ rights that may well
have been unparalleled in the Court’s history.7
Protection & Advocacy v. Stewart, one of the cases discussed herein that will be
argued during the upcoming Term. Nevertheless, the views expressed in this
essay are mine alone.
1. For more on the misappropriation of the term “federalism,” see JUDITH
RESNIK ET AL., FEDERALISMS (forthcoming 2011). See also Larry D. Kramer, But
When Exactly Was Judicially-Enforced Federalism “Born” in the First Place?, 22
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 123, 123 (1998) (“Aside from the fact that federalism
means preserving Congress’s power to act in areas properly subject to national
regulation as much as it means protecting the sovereignty of the states, no one
has ever really doubted that there are constitutional limits on the scope of
federal power.”).
2. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 726 (1991) (noting “[t]his
is a case about federalism” in the opening line of a case about procedural default
in post-conviction habeas cases).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (holding
that Congress did not have the power under the Commerce Clause to enact the
civil-remedy provisions of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568 (1995) (holding that Congress did not have
the power under the Commerce Clause to enact the Gun-Free School Zones Act
of 1990).
4. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511, 520 (1997)
(adopting a “congruence and proportionality” standard for whether federal
legislation is a permissible exercise of Congress’s Section Five power, and
holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991 did not meet that
standard).
5. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that
the Tenth Amendment bars Congress from “conscripting” state executive
officers into enforcing federal laws); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
176, 188 (1992) (holding that the Tenth Amendment bars Congress from
“commandeering” state legislatures by imposing particular policy choices upon
the states).
6. For helpful overviews of the Rehnquist Court’s jurisprudence, see
Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV.
343 (2002); Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary,
Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223 (2003); and Andrew M. Siegel,
The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in
the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097 (2006).
7. At the very least, the Rehnquist Court’s vision of states’ rights had no
parallel in any of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence subsequent to the
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Yet, for all the public and academic controversy that the
Court’s states’ rights jurisprudence engendered in other contexts,
no single doctrinal area better reflected this thematic trend (and
its controversial consequences) than the jurisprudence
surrounding the Eleventh Amendment8 and state sovereign
immunity.9 Indeed, although much of today’s state sovereign
immunity jurisprudence had its foundations in pre-1986
decisions,10 the Rehnquist Court dramatically expanded the scope
of state sovereign immunity in at least three respects: First, it
held in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida11 that Congress may
not use its Article I powers to subject non-consenting states to
suit in federal court.12 Second, it expanded Seminole Tribe to
also bar Congress from using its Article I powers to subject non-

enactment of the post-Civil War amendments. Prior to the Civil War, little of
the federal Constitution constrained the actions of states, and so the issue
seldom arose. See, e.g., Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250–51
(1833) (holding that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”).
9. The Court’s jurisprudence itself requires distinguishing between the
Eleventh Amendment specifically and state sovereign immunity generally. As
Justice Kennedy summarized, under the Rehnquist Court’s approach, the idea
of “Eleventh Amendment immunity . . . is convenient shorthand but something
of a misnomer, for the sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from,
nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment.” Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706, 713 (1999). See generally Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the
Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1 (1988).
10. As explained below, the current state of sovereign immunity
jurisprudence owes much to the Court’s decisions in Louisiana v. Jumel, 107
U.S. 711 (1882), and Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). For a concise
overview of the Court’s sovereign immunity jurisprudence, see Vicki C. Jackson
& Judith Resnik, Sovereignties—Federal, State, and Tribal: The Story of
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 329, 330–37,
354–57 (Judith Resnik & Vicki C. Jackson eds., 2009).
11. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
12. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); see also Coll. Sav.
Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 691
(1999) (reaffirming that Congress may not use any of its Article I powers to
abrogate the sovereign immunity of a non-consenting state); Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 648 (1999)
(same).
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consenting states to suit in state courts13 and in federal
administrative agencies14 as well. Third, it articulated a
previously unheard of exception15 to the doctrine of Ex parte
Young,16 which otherwise recognizes the ability of plaintiffs to
pursue injunctive relief against state officers for violations of
federal law.17 And although it is difficult to extract a clear rule
from the fractured opinions of the Court in Idaho v. Coeur
d’Alene Tribe of Idaho,18 it cannot be gainsaid that federalism
concerns had everything to do with the result.19
In addition, the Rehnquist Court’s contemporaneous
jurisprudence imposing tighter constraints on Congress’s exercise
of its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment also had a
significant impact on state sovereign immunity law.20 After
Seminole Tribe, Alden v. Maine, and Federal Maritime
Commission (FMC) v. South Carolina State Ports Authority,
Section Five was the only means pursuant to which Congress
could validly abrogate the sovereign immunity of non-consenting
states.21 Thus, in cases where the Court upheld federal statutes,
but concluded that they were enacted pursuant to Congress’s

13. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 760.
14. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n (FMC) v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743,

769 (2002).
15. See Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 287–88 (1997).
16. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
17. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 167 (1908).
18. Although Justice Kennedy wrote the principal opinion, only Chief
Justice Rehnquist joined the critical parts of his analysis. Justice O’Connor
wrote separately, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, expressing
disagreement with parts of Kennedy’s analysis and articulating narrower
grounds on which to base the result. See Idaho, 521 U.S. at 288–97 (O’Connor,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
19. See, e.g., id. at 274–80 (plurality opinion); id. at 296–97 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
20. See, e.g., FMC v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002); Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996).
21. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456–57 (1976) (holding that
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted pursuant to Congress’s
Section 5 power, and thereby could be used to obtain monetary relief against a
state).
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Article I powers, rather than Section Five,22 the practical result
was to cut off the ability of plaintiffs to enforce those statutes
directly against the states qua defendants. And like many of the
Rehnquist Court’s other federalism cases, virtually all of the
state sovereign immunity decisions were 5–4,23 with Justices
Kennedy and O’Connor almost always joining the more
conservative trio of Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and
Justice Thomas.24
For better or worse, the ideological lines did not move in any
case implicating the core of the Rehnquist Court’s approach to
state sovereign immunity.25 Instead, after Chief Justice Roberts
replaced Rehnquist in 2005, and Justice Alito replaced Justice
O’Connor in 2006, the question became whether the Roberts
Court would show the same ideological fealty to the state
sovereign immunity project as its predecessors.
Perhaps surprisingly, this question scarcely arose in the first
22. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374
(2001) (holding that Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act is not a valid
Section 5 statute); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (holding
that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act is not a valid Section 5
statute).
23. Increasingly, the Court’s Section 5 jurisprudence—unlike its sovereign
immunity-specific case law—did not hew to the traditional 5–4 split. See, e.g.,
United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159 (2006) (Scalia, J.) (holding, for a
unanimous Court, that Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act is a valid
Section 5 statute); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 740 (2003)
(Rehnquist, C.J.) (concluding, for a 6–3 Court, that the Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993 was a valid exercise of Congress’s Section 5 power).
24. To be sure, there were some sovereign immunity decisions where the
Court did not split along ideological lines. See, e.g., Tenn. Student Assistance
Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 454–55 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (holding, for a 7–2
Court, that an in rem bankruptcy proceeding does not implicate the Eleventh
Amendment); Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 624
(2002) (Breyer, J.) (concluding, for a unanimous Court, that a state waives its
sovereign immunity by removing a case to federal court, where it would not
have had immunity in state court).
25. One of the few counterexamples is itself telling: In Central Virginia
Community College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 379 (2006), Justice O’Connor provided
the fifth vote (along with Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) for
the proposition that Congress could abrogate the sovereign immunity of a nonconsenting state pursuant to the Bankruptcy Clause of Article I, a result wholly
inconsistent with Seminole Tribe and its progeny. Katz was one of four decisions
handed down on Justice O’Connor’s last day on the Supreme Court bench.
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five Terms that the Court included Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito. Other than an entirely uncontroversial 2006
decision holding that counties were not protected by the Eleventh
Amendment26 and the Chief Justice’s own dissent in a 2010
original jurisdiction dispute where the majority sidestepped the
issue,27 the five years since Justice Alito ascended to the bench
have seen remarkably little opportunity for reconsideration of the
Rehnquist Court’s approach to state sovereign immunity, even as
other federalism-laden topics—e.g., the Commerce Clause,28
Section Five,29 and the scope of post-conviction habeas corpus30—
have routinely come before the Justices.
That may change during the coming Term, with two cases
already on the docket that at least indirectly implicate the scope
and implications of the Rehnquist Court’s approach to state
sovereign immunity. In the first case, Virginia v. Reinhard,31 the
Fourth Circuit held, for the first time, that state-created agencies
may not invoke the doctrine of Ex parte Young as a means of
avoiding the Eleventh Amendment in suits for injunctive relief
against state officers.32 In the Fourth Circuit’s view, “federal
26. See N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Chatham Cnty., 547 U.S. 189, 197 (2006).
27. See Alabama v. North Carolina, 560 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S. Ct. 2295,

2317–19 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(explaining that, because one of the plaintiffs was not a sovereign state, the
defendant state’s sovereign immunity was implicated—and barred at least some
relief).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S. Ct. 1949,
1951–53 (2010) (upholding a federal statute providing for civil commitment of
dangerous sex offenders under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and
Proper Clause).
29. See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. ___,
___, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2523 (2009) (discussing, but not deciding, whether the preclearance requirements of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 are a valid
exercise of Congress’s authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment).
30. See, e.g., Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2553–54
(2010) (holding that equitable tolling is available for the one-year statute of
limitations imposed on post-conviction habeas petitions by the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996).
31. 568 F.3d 110 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom. Va. Office for Prot.
& Advocacy (VOPA) v. Stewart, 560 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 3493 (2010).
32. Virginia v. Reinhard, 568 F.3d 110, 124 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted
sub nom. Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy (VOPA) v. Stewart, 560 U.S. ___, 130
S. Ct. 3493 (2010).
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court adjudication of an ‘intramural contest’ between a state
agency and state officials encroaches more severely on the
dignity and sovereignty of the states than an Ex parte Young
action brought by a private plaintiff.”33 The Virginia Office for
Protection and Advocacy (VOPA) sought certiorari, and, whether
on its own merits, because the federal government (whose views
the Court requested34) recommended it,35 or because in the
interim, the en banc Seventh Circuit reached the diametrically
opposite conclusion,36 the Court granted certiorari, and the case
is set to be argued on December 1.37
In the second case, Sossamon v. Texas,38 the Fifth Circuit
waded into a circuit split as to whether states knowingly waive
their sovereign immunity when they accept federal funds under
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
(RLUIPA),39 given that § 4(a) of the Act creates a cause of action
for “appropriate relief” against “a government” for violations of
the Act.40 The Eleventh Circuit had previously answered that
question in the affirmative,41 whereas the Fourth Circuit had
answered it in the negative.42 Siding with the latter court of
appeals, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that “RLUIPA is clear enough
to create a right for damages on the cause-of-action analysis, but
not clear enough to do so in a manner that abrogates state

33. Id. at 119–20.
34. See VOPA v. Stewart, 560 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 1166 (2010) (mem.).
35. See generally Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, VOPA v.

Stewart, 560 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 3493 (2010) (No. 09-529), 2010 WL 3426282.
36. See Ind. Prot. & Advocacy Servs. v. Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin.,
603 F.3d 365, 367 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, 79 U.S.L.W.
3063 (U.S. July 21, 2010) (No. 10-131); see also id. at 392 (Easterbrook, C.J.,
dissenting) (noting his agreement with the majority’s rejection of Reinhard).
37. VOPA v. Stewart, 560 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 3493 (2010).
38. 560 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 560 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct.
3319 (2010).
39. Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc
to 2000cc-5 (2006)).
40. Id. § 4(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2 (2006)); cf. Sossamon, 560
F.3d at 331.
41. See Benning v. Georgia, 391 F.3d 1299, 1305–06 (11th Cir. 2004).
42. See Madison v. Virginia, 474 F.3d 118, 131 (4th Cir. 2006).
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sovereign immunity from suits for monetary relief.”43 Put
another way, the court of appeals concluded that the ambiguous
language of § 4(a) provided insufficiently clear notice to states
that they were subjecting themselves to monetary liability by
accepting federal funds under the statute, and so could not
constitute a valid waiver of sovereign immunity under the
Supreme Court’s Pennhurst I decision.44
As in Stewart, the Supreme Court invited the views of the
federal government,45 which again, recommended a grant of
certiorari.46 The Court agreed, albeit reframing the question
presented as: “Whether an individual may sue a State or state
official in his official capacity for damages for violations of
[RLUIPA].”47 Argument in Sossamon is set for November 2.
Whatever might be said about the merits of either decision, it
seems clear that both present questions as to the appropriate
scope of state sovereign immunity on a scale heretofore unseen in
the jurisprudence of the Roberts Court. Thus, the 2010 Term—
as much as any of the Court’s previous five sessions—may
provide crucial insight into whether the current Justices will
embrace the approach of their predecessors and thereby follow
the same ideological chasm that pervaded the Rehnquist Court’s
state sovereign immunity jurisprudence, or whether something
might change.
This preview essay does not attempt to predict what will
happen in either Stewart or Sossamon. Instead, I aim to situate
these two cases in their broader context—to explain both why
they are such important bellwethers for the Roberts Court, and
to suggest what, if anything, we might learn from their
resolution. Thus, Part I begins by providing a brief overview of
43. Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 331.
44. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman (Pennhurst I), 451

U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (“There can, of course, be no knowing acceptance if a State is
unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it.
Accordingly, if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal
moneys, it must do so unambiguously.” (footnote omitted)).
45. See Sossamon v. Texas, 130 S. Ct. 533 (2009) (mem.).
46. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Sossamon, 130 S. Ct. 3319 (No. 08-1438), 2010 WL 3167307.
47. Sossamon, 560 U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 3319 (2010).
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the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding state sovereign
immunity prior to the Roberts Court. I by no means seek to be
comprehensive, because forests can be—and have been—felled on
the Court’s jurisprudence in this area,48 which is, charitably,
rather contentious. Rather, Part I aims only to provide the
reader with enough background to understand the doctrinal
issues that the Roberts Court has yet to address, and will likely
confront in Stewart and Sossamon. Part II turns to Stewart and
Sossamon, providing brief, capsule summaries of the proceedings
in the lower courts and the issues presented before the Justices.
Finally, the Conclusion explains why Stewart and Sossamon
might go a long way in providing broader insight into the current
Court’s approach not just to state sovereign immunity, but to the
proper relationship between the states and the federal
government more generally.
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND STATE SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY TO 2006
A. Chisholm, the Eleventh Amendment, Jumel, and Hans
As drafted, one of the nine heads of federal jurisdiction
contained within Article III of the Constitution was jurisdiction
over “[c]ontroversies . . . between a State and Citizens of another
State.”49 Whether or not the Framers thereby intended to subject
non-consenting states to any suit by a citizen of another state,
the Supreme Court in one of its first significant decisions so
construed the provision, upholding jurisdiction in Chisholm v.
Georgia50 by a 4ï1 vote with regard to an assumpsit claim by a
South Carolina creditor who sought damages against Georgia for

48. It is impossible adequately to account for the excellent—and
voluminous—scholarship on the Court’s approach to state sovereign immunity.
Where possible, I have tried to note particularly useful articles at specific points
of this essay. Otherwise, though, interested readers can find useful citations in
the notes and footnotes of RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 869–941 (6th ed. 2009).
49. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
50. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
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goods obtained during the Revolutionary War.51
The decision in Chisholm led directly to the 1794 proposal
(and 1798 adoption) of the Eleventh Amendment, which provides:
“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”52 And, although all
agree that the purpose of the Eleventh Amendment was to
overrule Chisholm, the issue that has plagued the Court’s
subsequent state sovereign immunity jurisprudence is whether it
meant to do anything more.53 Four questions, at least, have
dominated subsequent case law and commentary: (1) Because the
Eleventh Amendment appears written in a manner so as to
excise the “citizen-state” diversity provision of Article III, does it
apply only to suits arising under that jurisdictional basis, or does
it also apply to other jurisdictional categories, especially federal
questions? Second, notwithstanding its language, does the
Eleventh Amendment also apply to suits by individuals against
their own state? Third, even if the Eleventh Amendment applies
to suits arising under federal law, can Congress abrogate a
state’s sovereign immunity if it does so expressly? Finally, does
the Eleventh Amendment apply to suits against state officers, as
opposed to the state itself?
Although the Eleventh Amendment scarcely arose in
litigation prior to the Civil War,54 a pair of cases arising out of

51. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). Justice Iredell’s
dissent would figure prominently in later Supreme Court decisions interpreting
the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 429–50 (Iredell, J., dissenting). For more on
the opinion—and how it may have been misunderstood—see John V. Orth, The
Truth About Justice Iredell’s Dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia (1793), 73 N.C. L.
REV. 255 (1994).
52. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
53. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); Hans v. Louisiana,
134 U.S. 1 (1889); Louisiana ex rel. Elliot v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1883); Osborn
v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
54. In Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), the Court held
that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar an appeal to the Supreme Court by
defendants convicted in state court. Although the state was nominally the
“defendant” on appeal, the Court concluded that the appeal was not a “suit”
within the meaning of the constitutional text. Id. at 412. Interestingly, as an
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Louisiana’s repudiation of its Civil War debts provided the Court
with an opportunity to answer the first two questions concerning
the Eleventh Amendment’s scope. Thus, in Louisiana ex rel.
Elliott v. Jumel,55 the Court for the first time applied the
Eleventh Amendment to bar a suit where the claim appeared to
arise under federal law, to wit, the Contract Clause of Article I.56
And, although Jumel was light on analysis as to this point,57 the
Court reiterated the conclusion seven years later in Hans v.
Louisiana.58 Hans, though, went an important step further,
concluding that the provision also barred suits by citizens against
their own states, notwithstanding the specific use of the word
“another” in the Amendment’s text. As Justice Bradley wrote:
It is true, the amendment does so read and[,] if there were no
other reason or ground for abating his suit, it might be
maintainable, and then we should have this anomalous result,
that in cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the
United States, a State may be sued in the federal courts by its
own citizens, though it cannot be sued for a like cause of action
by the citizens of other States, or of a foreign state, and may be
thus sued in the federal courts, although not allowing itself to
be sued in its own courts.59

alternative holding, Marshall also noted that the Eleventh Amendment
wouldn’t apply anyway, since the appellants were citizens of Virginia. See id.
In Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 857 (1824),
discussed infra, the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar suit
where the real “party on the record” was a state officer, rather than the state
itself. And in Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 723–31
(1838), the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar a suit by a
state against another state. Otherwise, there is little of significance in the
Court’s pre-Civil War Eleventh Amendment case law.
55. 107 U.S. 711 (1883).
56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; see also Jumel, 107 U.S. 711.
57. For an argument that Jumel, like Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890),
did not really involve a federal question, see William Burnham, Taming the
Eleventh Amendment Without Overruling Hans v. Louisiana, 40 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 931 (1989).
58. 134 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1890).
59. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890); see also id. at 11 (“This
amendment, expressing the will of the ultimate sovereignty of the whole
country, superior to all legislatures and all courts, actually reversed the
decision of the Supreme Court. It did not in terms prohibit suits by individuals
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Hans thereby raised the spectacle of the Eleventh
Amendment barring any suit against a non-consenting state, and
also represented the beginning of a trend in which the Court
would consistently adopt readings of the constitutional text that
were at least superficially incompatible with its plain language.60
As Justice Scalia would summarize in looking back at the Court’s
jurisprudence a century later:
Despite the narrowness of its terms, since Hans v. Louisiana,
we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so
much for what it says, but for the presupposition of our
constitutional structure which it confirms: that the States
entered the federal system with their sovereignty intact; that
the judicial authority in Article III is limited by this
sovereignty; and that a State will therefore not be subject to
suit in federal court unless it has consented to suit, either
expressly or in the “plan of the convention.”61

That understanding would be at the heart of the Rehnquist
Court’s jurisprudence.
B. Officer Suits and Ex parte Young
Juxtaposed against Hans and the increasing possibility that
no judicial relief could be obtained against non-consenting states
for violations of federal law was the Court’s convoluted
jurisprudence regarding suits against state officers. As early as
1824, Chief Justice Marshall had suggested in Osborn v. Bank of
the United States62 that the Eleventh Amendment did not apply
to suits challenging the constitutionality of state action where
against the States, but declared that the Constitution should not be construed
to import any power to authorize the bringing of such suits.”).
60. See, e.g., Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 330 (1934) (holding that
the Eleventh Amendment also bars suits by foreign countries against states);
Ex parte New York 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921) (holding that the Eleventh
Amendment bars certain admiralty suits, even though its text refers only to
suits “in law or equity”). For the Court’s inconsistent subsequent jurisprudence
with regard to the Eleventh Amendment and admiralty, see FALLON, supra note
48, at 882 n.10.
61. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)
(citations omitted).
62. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
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the state itself was not the “party on the record.”63 As Marshall
explained, “a void act [cannot] afford protection to the person
who executes it.”64
But it was not as easy as simply naming a state officer,
instead of the state. Instead, for the better part of the nineteenth
century, the Court’s jurisprudence vacillated over the criteria for
distinguishing between officer suits that could go forward and
those that were really against the state—and which the Eleventh
Amendment therefore barred. In the aftermath of Hans, the
Court handed down a trio of decisions—Pennoyer v.
McConnaughy,65 Reagan v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.,66 and
Smyth v. Ames67—that seemed to more categorically embrace the
availability of officer suits for any constitutional claim.68 But its
1899 decision in Fitts v. McGhee69 again muddied the waters,
with Justice Harlan holding that the Eleventh Amendment
barred a constitutional challenge to a state bridge toll because
the “state officers named held [no] special relation to the
particular statute alleged to be unconstitutional. They were not
expressly directed to see to its enforcement.”70
Then, in 1908, the Court bit the proverbial bullet, holding in
Ex parte Young that the Eleventh Amendment generally
interposes no barrier to suits against state officers alleging
violations of the federal Constitution.71 In what future scholars
and jurists would often describe as a “fiction,”72 the Young Court
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 797.
Id. at 839.
140 U.S. 1 (1891).
154 U.S. 362 (1894).
169 U.S. 466 (1898).
Pennoyer, 140 U.S. at 19; Reagan, 154 U.S. at 389; Smyth, 169 U.S. at

518–19.
69. 172 U.S. 516 (1899).
70. Fitts v. McGhee, 72 U.S. 516, 530 (1899). For much more on this period
and the Court’s doctrinal evolution, see BARRY FRIEDMAN, The Story of Ex parte
Young: Once Controversial, Now Canon, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES, supra
note 10, at 247, 256–59.
71. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908).
72. Compare Ann Althouse, When to Believe a Legal Fiction: Federal
Interests and the Eleventh Amendment, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1123 (1989), with
John Harrison, Ex parte Young, 60 STAN. L. REV. 989 (2008).
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concluded that state officers, though “state actors” for purposes of
the Fourteenth Amendment, were not in fact the “state” for
purposes of the Eleventh Amendment whenever they acted in
violation of the Constitution.73 As Justice Peckham explained:
If the act which the state Attorney General seeks to enforce be
a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer in
proceeding under such enactment comes into conflict with the
superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case
stripped of his official or representative character and is
subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual
conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any
immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the
United States.74

This animating principle of Ex parte Young—that “state
officials do not employ the Eleventh Amendment as a means of
avoiding compliance with federal law”75—has “become bedrock,”76
with some scholars going so far as to suggest that it is
“indispensable to the establishment of constitutional government
and the rule of law.”77 But it, too, has encountered subsequent
judge-made limitations. Thus, in Edelman v. Jordan,78 the
Supreme Court limited relief under Ex parte Young to claims
seeking prospective relief, reasoning that the Eleventh
Amendment still barred any “suit by private parties seeking to
impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the
state treasury.”79 And in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
73. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159.
74. Id. at 159–60 (citing In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 507 (1887)); see also id.

at 159 (“The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and if it be so,
the use of the name of the State to enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury
of complainants is a proceeding without the authority of and one which does not
affect the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity.”).
75. Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S.
139, 146 (1993).
76. FRIEDMAN, supra note 70, at 247.
77. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS § 48, at 314 (6th ed. 2002).
78. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
79. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). To say that the
prospective/retrospective distinction has proven elusive would be an epic
understatement. See generally Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Night and Day: Coeur
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Halderman (Pennhurst II),80 the Court held that Ex parte Young
could not be invoked to pursue injunctive relief against state
officers for violations of state law, reasoning that “[a] federal
court’s grant of relief against state officials on the basis of state
law, whether prospective or retroactive, does not vindicate the
supreme authority of federal law.”81
Although Edelman and Pennhurst II together constrained
the scope of Ex parte Young to suits seeking prospective relief for
violations of federal law, they may have also strengthened its
core.
After all, both decisions suggested that the central
principle underlying Young is the need to vindicate the
supremacy of federal law—a need that is less pressing where the
state’s violation occurred in the past, and that is altogether
nonexistent in the context of violations of state law.82 As thenJustice Rehnquist explained one year after Pennhurst II, “the
availability of prospective relief of the sort awarded in Ex parte
Young gives life to the Supremacy Clause. Remedies designed to
end a continuing violation of federal law are necessary to
vindicate the federal interest in assuring the supremacy of that
law.”83 Thus, when Rehnquist was promoted the following year
to Chief Justice, the heart of Ex parte Young was unquestionably
intact.
C. The Rehnquist Court and Ex parte Young
Notwithstanding the vitality of Ex parte Young’s core
principle circa 1985, two decisions issued by the Rehnquist Court
one year apart called the 1908 decision’s continuing vitality into
serious question. The first came in 1996 in Seminole Tribe of

d’Alene, Breard, and the Unraveling of the Prospective-Retrospective Distinction
in Eleventh Amendment Doctrine, 87 GEO. L.J. 1 (1998).
80. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
81. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman (Pennhurst II), 465 U.S.
89, 106 (1984).
82. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Principle and Compromise in Constitutional
Adjudication: The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 953, 990 (2000).
83. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985).
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Florida v. Florida.84 In addition to holding that Congress could
not use its authority under the Indian Commerce Clause to
subject non-consenting states to suit (more on that in a moment),
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court also rejected the
Tribe’s alternative argument that it could pursue an Ex parte
Young remedy to enforce the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
(IGRA)85 against the relevant Florida state officers.86 Suggesting
for the first time that the remedy under Ex parte Youngmight be
Rehnquist’s
opinion
emphasized
the
discretionary,87
comprehensive nature of the remedial scheme created by the
IGRA, and the incompatibility of such a scheme with a remedy
under Ex parte Young.88 In his words, “it is difficult to see why
an Indian tribe would suffer through the intricate scheme of [the
IGRA] when more complete and more immediate relief would be
available under Ex parte Young.”89
One year later, the Court appeared to take another step back
from Ex parte Young in Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho.90
The Court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred a suit by a
Native American tribe against a state and its officials, where the
suit sought injunctive relief with regard to a claim of ownership
to submerged lands and the bed of a lake arising out of an 1873
Executive Order that had established the boundaries of the
tribe’s reservation.91 The Court fractured, though, as to why
relief under Ex parte Young was unavailable.92 In the “principal”
opinion, Justice Kennedy (writing for only himself and Chief
Justice Rehnquist on these points) suggested that injunctive
84. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
85. Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2472 (1988) (codified as amended at 25

U.S.C. §§ 2701–21 (2006)).
86. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47.
87. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 74 (“[W]here Congress has prescribed a
detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement against a State of a statutorily
created right, a court should hesitate before casting aside those limitations and
permitting an action against a state officer based upon Ex parte Young.”
(emphasis added)).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 75.
90. 521 U.S. 261 (1997) (plurality opinion).
91. Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 287–88 (1997).
92. Id. at 288.

114

VLADECK FINAL

2010]

10/25/2010 3:12 PM

State Sovereign Immunity

relief for violations of federal law under Ex parte Young should
only be available in two circumstances: (1) in the absence of a
state forum that could provide relief for the violation of federal
law; or (2) where a “balancing” of federal and state interests
warranted a federal forum even where a state forum was also
available.93 As Kennedy concluded, “the Young fiction is an
exercise in line-drawing. There is no reason why the line cannot
be drawn to reflect the real interests of States consistent with the
clarity and certainty appropriate to the Eleventh Amendment’s
jurisdictional inquiry.”94
Writing for herself and Justices Scalia and Thomas, Justice
O’Connor agreed with the result, but sharply disagreed with
what she viewed as Justice Kennedy’s attempt to recast the test
for the availability of relief under Ex parte Young. As she
explained:
[T]he principal opinion replaces a straightforward inquiry into
whether a complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law
and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective with a
vague balancing test that purports to account for a “broad”
range of unspecified factors. In applying that approach here,
the principal opinion relies on characteristics of this case that
do not distinguish it from cases in which the Young doctrine is
properly invoked, such as the fact that the complaint names
numerous public officials and the fact that the State will have a
continuing interest in litigation against its officials. These
factors cannot supply a basis for deciding this case. Every
Young suit names public officials, and we have never doubted
the importance of state interests in cases falling squarely
within our past interpretations of the Young doctrine.95

Because of the bad fracture between the two opinions
supporting the result, it was unclear whether—and to what
extent—Justice Kennedy’s attempted reformulation of Ex parte
Young was anything more than sui generis. At the very least,

93. See id. at 270–80.
94. Id. at 280.
95. Id. at 296 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the

judgment) (citations omitted). Justice O’Connor nevertheless concurred
because, as she explained, “[w]here a plaintiff seeks to divest the State of all
regulatory power over submerged lands—in effect, to invoke a federal court’s
jurisdiction to quiet title to sovereign lands—it simply cannot be said that the
suit is not a suit against the State.” Id.
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though, Coeur d’Alene opened the door to a reconsideration of the
core of Ex parte Young—and to a states’ rights-based
reassessment of whether relief really would always be available
whenever a litigant sought federal injunctive relief against a
state officer.
D. The Rehnquist Court and Congress’s Abrogation Power
The unprecedented nature of the Rehnquist Court’s
jurisprudence with regard to Ex parte Young paled in comparison
to its jurisprudence with regard to Congress’s power vel non to
abrogate the sovereign immunity of a non-consenting state. In
retrospect, then-Justice Rehnquist himself set the stage in 1976,
in explaining for the Court in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer96 why Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 could validly subject nonconsenting states (and their officials) to damages liability.97 As he
wrote:
[T]he Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state
sovereignty which it embodies, are necessarily limited by the
enforcement provisions of [Section Five] of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In that section Congress is expressly granted
authority to enforce “by appropriate legislation” the
substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
themselves embody significant limitations on state authority.
When Congress acts pursuant to [Section Five], not only is it
exercising legislative authority that is plenary within the
terms of the constitutional grant, it is exercising that authority
under one section of a constitutional Amendment whose other
sections by their own terms embody limitations on state
authority. We think that Congress may, in determining what is
“appropriate legislation” for the purpose of enforcing the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private
suits against States or state officials which are constitutionally
impermissible in other contexts.98

96. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
97. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
98. Id. (citations omitted).
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Focusing on the uniqueness of Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment begged the question whether Congress could
similarly act pursuant to its other regulatory powers, especially
those conferred by Article I of the Constitution. That question
had been raised but arguably left unresolved in a 1964 case,99
and it would not be until 1989 that a plurality of the Court, in
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,100 answered that question in the
affirmative, sustaining a suit brought pursuant to two federal
environmental statutes enacted under the Commerce Clause.101
The theory underlying Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion,
mirroring parts of his opinion twenty-five years earlier in
Parden, was that, as in Fitzpatrick, states had acceded to liability
in the “plan of the convention.”102 Thus:
[T]o the extent that the States gave Congress the authority to
regulate commerce, they also relinquished their immunity
where Congress found it necessary, in exercising this
authority, to render them liable. The States held liable under
such a congressional enactment are thus not “unconsenting”;
they gave their consent all at once, in ratifying the
Constitution containing the Commerce Clause, rather than on
a case-by-case basis.103

Justice White, who provided the crucial fifth vote in favor of
the judgment, disagreed that the two statutes were sufficiently
clear in abrogating the sovereign immunity of non-consenting
states.104
Because a majority of the Court (including the
dissenters) concluded that they were, though, he joined cause
with the plurality on the constitutional question, cryptically

99. See Parden v. Terminal Ry. of the Ala. State Docks Dep’t, 377 U.S. 184,
189, 196 (1964) (rejecting Alabama’s claim of immunity in a suit under the
Federal Employers’ Liability Act, but leaving somewhat unclear whether the
result rested on valid abrogation of sovereign immunity, or on Alabama’s waiver
of sovereign immunity).
100. 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality opinion).
101. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 23 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
102. Id. at 19 (plurality opinion).
103. Id. at 19–20.
104. Id. at 55–56 (White, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
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noting that “I agree with the conclusion reached by JUSTICE
BRENNAN in Part III of his opinion, that Congress has the
authority under Article I to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment
immunity of the States, although I do not agree with much of his
reasoning.”105
Seven years later, the Court in Seminole Tribe overruled
Union Gas, holding that states had not acceded to liability under
the Indian Commerce Clause in the “plan of the convention.”106
As Chief Justice Rehnquist explained:
Never before the decision in Union Gas had we suggested
that the bounds of Article III could be expanded by Congress
operating pursuant to any constitutional provision other than
the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, it had seemed
fundamental that Congress could not expand the jurisdiction of
the federal courts beyond the bounds of Article III.107

Thus, because the Eleventh Amendment—as interpreted in
Hans—limited the jurisdiction of the federal courts in any suit
against a non-consenting state, Congress lacked the authority to
restore that jurisdiction by providing for relief against a nonconsenting state.108 Put another way, the Court in Seminole
Tribe “constitutionaliz[ed]” Hans,109 holding that the Eleventh
Amendment did not merely reaffirm a sovereign immunity on the
part of the states that derived from the common law, but that it
in fact codified as constitutional law a sovereign immunity that
was not subject to congressional interference—except in the
unique case of the Fourteenth Amendment.110
Indeed, although Seminole Tribe only expressly disavowed
Congress’s power to abrogate the sovereign immunity of a nonconsenting state pursuant to the Commerce Clause, later cases
would emphasize that its logic compelled the conclusion that all
Article I powers were equal—that the Eleventh Amendment
effectively trumped all of Congress’s original regulatory
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

118

Id. at 57.
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996).
Id. at 65.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 117 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 76 (majority opinion).
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authority, if for no other reason than because it came later.111
Whereas the decision in Seminole Tribe was heavily
criticized, the Court sparked even more controversy three years
later, when it held in Alden v. Maine112 that Congress was also
barred from abrogating the sovereign immunity of a nonconsenting state in state court as well, even though the Eleventh
Amendment specifically refers only to federal jurisdiction.113 In a
similar vein as Hans, the Court relied on the potential “anomaly”
that would result from a rule that differentiated between
Congress’s power vis-à-vis the states in federal courts versus
state courts,114 suggesting that the Eleventh Amendment merely
confirmed the background sovereignty that states necessarily
enjoyed in their own courts at the time of the Founding, as
protected by the Tenth Amendment—if not the Eleventh.115
Leaving aside the Court’s disputed analysis of Founding-era
history, the shift in analytical focus prompted Justice Souter’s
sarcastic observation in dissent that, under the majority’s view:
Seminole Tribe’s contorted reliance on the Eleventh
Amendment and its background was presumably unnecessary;
the Tenth would have done the work with an economy that the
majority in Seminole Tribe would have welcomed. Indeed, if
the Court’s current reasoning is correct, the Eleventh
Amendment itself was unnecessary. Whatever Article III may
originally have said about the federal judicial power, the
embarrassment to the State of Georgia occasioned by attempts
in federal court to enforce the State’s war debt could easily
have been avoided if only the Court that decided Chisholm v.
Georgia, had understood a State’s inherent, Tenth Amendment
right to be free of any judicial power, whether the court be
state or federal, and whether the cause of action arise under

111. See, e.g., Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (reaffirming that Congress may not use any of its
Article I powers to abrogate the sovereign immunity of a non-consenting state);
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627
(1999) (same).
112. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
113. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999).
114. See id. at 751–53.
115. Id. at 713–14.
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state or federal law.116

Nevertheless, the Court took the anti-abrogation logic one
final step afield three years later, holding in Federal Maritime
Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority117 that
Congress similarly could not abrogate the immunity of a nonconsenting state in a federal administrative agency.118 Whatever
the merits of these decisions, they at least had the effect of
producing a clear, categorical rule: Congress could never subject
non-consenting states to in personam liability pursuant to any of
its Article I powers.
E. Verizon and Katz: Two Chinks in the Federalism Armor?
Notwithstanding the decisiveness of the Seminole Tribe line
of cases, and the crack in Ex parte Young’s façade suggested by
Coeur d’Alene, the Court appeared to step back from the abyss in
a pair of decisions in the early 2000s. The first decision was
prompted by the Fourth Circuit’s reliance on Coeur d’Alene—and,
more specifically, Justice Kennedy’s opinion therein—in
precluding relief under Ex parte Young in a suit brought by a
telecommunications
carrier
to
enforce
the
federal
Telecommunications Act against the Chairman of the Public
Service Commission of Maryland.119 Specifically, the court of
appeals had stressed that “just because a private citizen’s federal
suit seeks declaratory injunctive relief against State officials does
not mean that it must automatically be allowed to proceed under
an exception to the Eleventh Amendment protection.”120 Writing
for an 8–0 Court in reversing the Fourth Circuit, Justice Scalia
concluded precisely to the contrary.121 Stressing the limited
nature of Coeur d’Alene, his opinion reaffirmed the need to
resolve only the “straightforward inquiry” at the heart of Ex

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 761 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
535 U.S. 743 (2002).
FMC v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002).
Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635 (2002).
Bell Atl. Md., Inc. v. MCI WorldCom, Inc., 240 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir.
2001), rev’d sub nom. Verizon Md. Inc., 535 U.S. at 635.
121. Verizon Md., Inc., 535 U.S. at 648.
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parte Young, i.e., “whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing
violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as
prospective.”122 Justice Kennedy wrote separately to explain why
the majority’s analysis was consistent with his approach in Coeur
d’Alene, but his concurrence was only for himself.123 Otherwise,
the rest of the Verizon Court appeared to treat Coeur d’Alene as a
one-off exception to Ex parte Young, and not as a reformulation of
the doctrine in any material respect.124
The second decision represented perhaps an even greater
broadside to the principles underlying the Rehnquist Court’s
state sovereign immunity jurisprudence. Although the Court had
already carved out an exception to the Eleventh Amendment for
in rem proceedings before bankruptcy courts,125 its January 2006
decision in Central Virginia Community College v. Katz126 went a
critical step further, holding that Congress could abrogate the
sovereign immunity of a non-consenting state pursuant to the
Bankruptcy Clause of Article I.127 Even though the analytical
core of Seminole Tribe and its successors was the proposition that
none of Congress’s Article I powers could be used to subject a
non-consenting state to suit, Justice Stevens wrote for a 5–4
majority to explain why bankruptcy was “different,” dismissing
the Court’s earlier suggestions to the contrary as mere “dicta.”128

122. Id. at 645 (quoting Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261,
296 (1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment))
(alteration in original).
123. Id. at 649 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
124. Id. at 646 (majority opinion).
125. See Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 451 (2004).
126. 546 U.S. 356 (2006).
127. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 378 (2006).
128. Id. at 363

We acknowledge that statements in both the majority and the
dissenting opinions in Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, reflected an
assumption that the holding in that case would apply to the
Bankruptcy Clause. Careful study and reflection have convinced us,
however, that that assumption was erroneous. For the reasons stated
by Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia, we are not bound to
follow our dicta in a prior case in which the point now at issue was not
fully debated.
Id. (citations omitted).
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The majority’s attempt to sidestep the issue notwithstanding,
it is objectively impossible to reconcile Katz with Seminole Tribe
and its progeny. The only real explanation is the composition of
the majority: With Chief Justice Roberts embracing the same
theory as his predecessor (and former boss), the Court split along
the same traditional axis, except for Justice O’Connor. On the
last day in which she participated in decisions (the Senate
confirmed Justice Alito as her successor eight days later),129 and
with no separate statement explaining the change-of-heart,
Justice O’Connor switched sides, abandoning the entire
foundation on which the Rehnquist Court’s anti-abrogation
jurisprudence had been predicated.
***
Given the decisions in Verizon and Katz, both of which
suggested that the Justices were already retreating from the
high-water mark of the Rehnquist Court’s state sovereign
immunity jurisprudence, it would have been entirely
understandable for this body of cases to be one of the more
closely watched areas for the Justices subsequent to Justice
Alito’s swearing in on January 31, 2006. And yet, even as the
Court revisited a number of decisions in which Justice O’Connor
had been the swing vote, state sovereign immunity stayed
surprisingly off the radar, emerging only in uncontroversial cases
or in dissent. More than just the usual curiosity over the extent
to which new Justices will or will not follow in their predecessors’
footsteps, the absence of meaningful jurisprudence with regard to
state sovereign immunity means that it is still unclear whether
the small but significant retreats in Verizon and Katz described
above were the beginning of a larger trend, or rather bumps
along an otherwise continuous road.
And that is where the 2010 Term might provide key insights.

129. 152 CONG. REC. S340,348 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 2006).
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III. STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, THE ROBERTS COURT,
AND THE 2010 TERM
A. VOPA v. Stewart: A Battle for Ex parte Young’s Analytical
Core
In 1986, after public hearings uncovered widespread abuse
and neglect in psychiatric facilities, Congress enacted the
Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illnesses
(PAIMI) Act130 to “ensure that the rights of individuals with
mental illness are protected” and to “assist States to establish
and operate a protection and advocacy system for individuals
with mental illness which will . . . protect and advocate the rights
of such individuals through activities to ensure the enforcement
of the Constitution and Federal and State statutes.”131 To that
end, the Act provides funding for a state so long as the state
designates a “protection and advocacy system” to accomplish
these goals.132 Under the Act, the state can choose whether the
designated “P&A” system is an independent state agency or a
private entity.133 Either way, the Act vests the agency with the
authority to access necessary patient records and, where
appropriate, to “pursue administrative, legal, and other
appropriate remedies to ensure the protection of individuals with
mental illness who are receiving care or treatment in the
State.”134
Virginia, like most states, chose to accept funds under the
PAIMI Act and create a public agency—the Virginia Office for
Protection and Advocacy (VOPA)—to administer the program.135
130. Pub. L. No. 99-319, 100 Stat. 478 (1986) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 10801–10851 (2006)). The Act was originally captioned the “Protection
and Advocacy for Mentally Ill Individuals Act,” but Congress amended the
name to the “Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illnesses
Act” in 2000. See Prot. & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities v. Mental
Health & Addiction Servs., 448 F.3d 119, 121 n.1 (2d Cir. 2006).
131. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10801(b)(1), (b)(2)(A) (2006).
132. See id. § 10803(2)(A).
133. See id. § 10802(2) (incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 15044(a), part of the
Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 2000).
134. Id. § 10805(a)(1)(B).
135. VA. CODE ANN. § 51.5-39.2 (2009), http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/
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In 2007, VOPA brought suit against James Reinhard,
Commissioner of Virginia’s Department of Mental Health,
Mental Retardation, and Substance Abuse Services.136
Specifically, VOPA sought injunctive relief requiring the
production of records relating to three incidents resulting in
death or serious injuries for patients in the Department’s
custody, claiming that the Department’s failure to provide those
records violated the PAIMI Act.137 Reinhard, in turn, claimed
that the records were protected by “peer review privilege,” and
that, in the alternative, the suit was barred by sovereign
immunity.138
In July 2008, the district court rejected Reinhard’s motion to
dismiss, concluding that VOPA’s complaint did state a viable
cause of action under federal law, and that Reinhard was not
protected by sovereign immunity.139 In particular, the district
court concluded both that VOPA’s suit “falls within the purview
of Ex parte Young,” and that no “special sovereignty interests”
precluded an Ex parte Young remedy.140
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed.141 Writing for a
unanimous panel, Judge Wilkinson reasoned that VOPA’s suit
was not an ordinary Ex parte Young action, but rather an
extraordinary suit by one state agency against the director of
another. Invoking the spirit if not the text of Justice Kennedy’s
plurality opinion in Coeur d’Alene, Wilkinson concluded that:
VOPA seeks to expand Ex parte Young to allow a federal court,
without the imprimatur of Congress or the consent of the state,
to resolve a dispute between a state agency and state officials.
Recognizing an inherent power in the federal courts to settle
this sort of internecine feud—”to turn the State against
itself”—would disparage the status of the states as sovereigns.
legp504.exe?000+coh+51.5-39.2+500317.
136. Virginia v. Reinhard, No. 07-CV-734, 2008 WL 2795940 (E.D. Va. July
18, 2008), rev’d, 568 F.3d 110 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom. Va. Office
for Prot. & Advocacy (VOPA) v. Stewart, 560 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 3493 (2010).
137. Id. at *1.
138. See id. at *2 (summarizing the background).
139. Id. at *6.
140. See id. at *5–*7.
141. Reinhard, 568 F.3d at 113.
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Moreover, just as Pennhurst observed that states and their
officials have an interest against appearing in federal court
over issues of state law, states have a similar interest in not
having a federal court referee contests between their agencies.
Further, allowing a state agency to decide on its own accord to
sue officials of another state agency and to obtain relief from
an Article III judge would create difficult questions of political
accountability. Where exactly could citizens dissatisfied with
the outcome of such a federal court case turn for political
redress? The answer is not obvious. For these reasons,
granting a federal forum to “a state’s warring factions” based
on alleged violations of federal law would be an unwarranted
extension of Ex parte Young.142

Thus, despite Verizon’s reiteration that Ex parte Young
requires only a “straightforward inquiry into whether [the]
complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and
seeks relief properly characterized as prospective,” and
conceding that, were VOPA a private agency, it would be able
to pursue Ex parte Young relief,143 the court of appeals
concluded that, as a state-created agency, sovereign
immunity barred its suit.144
Although there was no dissent in Reinhard, two
counterarguments were offered by the en banc Seventh
Circuit in its decision in a closely analogous case handed
down while VOPA’s petition for certiorari was pending.
First,
[A] closer look at the details of this case shows that the
defendants’ effort to portray this case as an “intramural”
dispute is not persuasive. While the defendant Secretary of the
Family and Social Services Administration serves at the
pleasure of the governor, plaintiff IPAS is not a traditional
state agency. It is independent of the governor to a degree that
is unusual and perhaps unique among Indiana agencies.145

142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 120–21 (citations omitted).
See id. at 118–19.
Id. at 124–25.
Ind. Prot. & Advocacy Servs. v. Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin., 603
F.3d 365, 373 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, 79 U.S.L.W. 3063
(July 21, 2010) (No. 10-131).
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Second, as Judge Hamilton wrote for the unanimous court of
appeals:
Congress gave each state the choice to establish a protection
and advocacy system as either an independent state agency or
a private not-for-profit entity. Indiana made the choice to set
up IPAS as an independent state agency. If we gave that choice
any weight in the Eleventh Amendment inquiry, we would be
permitting Indiana to use its own choice to set up an
independent state agency as a means to shield its state
hospitals and institutions from the very investigatory and
oversight powers that Congress funded to protect some of the
state’s most vulnerable citizens. That result would be strange
indeed.146

In other words, the Seventh Circuit’s disagreement with the
Fourth Circuit was predicated on two distinct arguments: First,
that lawsuits by P&A systems against state officials do resemble
traditional Ex parte Young actions; and second, that states in
accepting funds under the PAIMI Act and choosing to create a
public, rather than private, agency, are effectively waiving their
sovereign immunity in any event.
However convincing the Seventh Circuit’s focus on waiver
and the unique nature of P&A systems may be, it belies the
extent to which the Fourth Circuit’s decision is incompatible with
one of the central tenets of the Supreme Court’s Ex parte Young
jurisprudence. After all, the underlying theory of the doctrine is
that the defendant-officer is not acting as the state when he is
continuing to act in violation of federal law,147 which renders the
identity of the plaintiff all-but irrelevant. At the same time,
state-created agencies (like VOPA) may well be an “arm” of the

146. Id.
147. See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159 (1908) (“The act to be

enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional; and if it be so, the use of the name of
the state to enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury of complainants is a
proceeding without the authority of, and one which does not affect, the state in
its sovereign or governmental capacity.”).
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state for Eleventh Amendment purposes.148 Thus, the irony of
the VOPA litigation is that Judge Wilkinson may have been
entirely correct that the special sovereignty interests of the
states is implicated in suits like VOPA’s—but on the plaintiff’s
side of the “v.,” rather than the defendant’s.149
B. Sossamon v. Texas: Spending Conditions and/as “Waivers”
As noted above, waiver is also at the heart of the other state
sovereign immunity case that the Court will be considering
during the 2010 Term. Specifically, Sossamon v. Texas concerns
a challenge by a state prisoner to a Texas policy of prohibiting
prisoners on cell restriction from participating in certain
religious services.150 Sossamon brought suit, claiming that the
Texas policy interfered with his rights under the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment, the Texas Religious Freedom
Act, and RLUIPA, which provides that “[a] person may assert a
violation of this chapter as a claim or defense in a judicial
proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a
government.”151

148. Cf. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280
(1977) (noting that whether an entity is an “arm of the state” for Eleventh
Amendment purposes “depends, at least in part, upon the nature of the entity
created by state law”). To be sure, whether VOPA is an “arm of the state” is a
complex question of both Virginia state and federal law. See, e.g., Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 n.5 (1997) (“Ultimately, of course, the
question whether a particular state agency has the same kind of independent
status as a county or is instead an arm of the State, and therefore ‘one of the
United States’ within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment, is a question of
federal law. But that federal question can be answered only after considering
the provisions of state law that define the agency’s character.”). But the
complexity of that question only further underscores the notion that sovereignty
concerns, to the extent they are even present, come on the plaintiff’s side of the
case.
149. Cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518, 520 n.17 (2007)
(suggesting how special considerations may enter into play where states are
plaintiffs in civil litigation).
150. Sossamon v. Texas, No. 06-CA-033, 2007 WL 7135950, at *6 (W.D. Tex.
Mar. 28, 2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, dismissed in part, 560 F.3d 316 (5th
Cir. 2009), cert. granted in part, 560 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 3319 (2010).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a) (2006); cf. Sossaman, 2007 WL 7135950, at *6.
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As to the RLUIPA claim, the district court concluded
somewhat cursorily that (1) RLUIPA does not authorize a
damages remedy against either individual officers or the state;
and (2) to the extent that it does, such relief is barred by the
Eleventh Amendment because RLUIPA does not include a valid
waiver of sovereign immunity—that the statute is insufficiently
clear that “appropriate relief” might include damages.152 The
Fifth Circuit agreed, noting that “[w]hen deciding the validity of
a putative waiver of sovereign immunity through a state’s
participation in a Spending Clause ‘contract,’ we ask whether
Congress spoke with sufficient clarity to put the state on notice
that, to accept federal funds, the state must also accept liability
for monetary damages.”153 Futhermore, the court stated:
[W]e must presume that Congress intended to afford all
ordinary remedies not expressly disclaimed when we interpret
the ambiguous language it uses to create a cause of action. We
may not presume the same when we ask whether a state
knowingly waived its immunity from damages when damages
are not expressly provided. RLUIPA is clear enough to create a
right for damages on the cause-of-action analysis, but not clear
enough to do so in a manner that abrogates state sovereign
immunity from suits for monetary relief.154

Thus, Texas did not waive its immunity to damages claims in
accepting funds under RLUIPA.
In so holding, the Fifth Circuit joined cause with the Fourth
Circuit, which had already so concluded in Madison v.
Virginia.155 The Eleventh Circuit, reasoning to the contrary in
Benning v. Georgia,156 focused not on the specific remedy
RLUIPA provided, but on the clarity with which RLUIPA
subjected states to “appropriate relief” for cases in which the
statute was violated.157 Thus, the circuit split turns almost

152. Sossaman, 2007 WL 7135950, at *8 (citing Madison v. Virginia, 474
F.3d 118 (4th Cir. 2006)).
153. Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 330.
154. Id. at 331 (footnotes omitted).
155. Madison, 474 F.3d at 122
156. 391 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2004).
157. Benning v. Georgia, 391 F.3d 1299, 1305–06 (11th Cir. 2004).
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entirely on whether a Spending Clause statute must be
unambiguous as to only the existence of liability, or specifically to
the particular mode thereof.
C. Why Stewart and Sossamon Matter
By now, it should hopefully be clear that neither Stewart nor
Sossamon implicate the core of the Rehnquist Court’s approach
to state sovereign immunity. Neither raises fundamental
questions about the particular nature of the “sovereignty” that
states possessed prior to the Founding, nor does either case raise
questions about the current scope of Congress’s abrogation power
along the lines of the Katz case in 2006. If anything, both cases
may well be resolved on statutory construction grounds—
focusing on whether the PAIMI Act and RLUIPA are sufficiently
clear with respect to waiving the recipient states’ sovereign
immunity.
But lurking behind both cases, Stewart specifically, is just
how far unique concerns over the sovereignty of the states should
go in influencing otherwise clear doctrinal rules. Thus, in
Stewart, there is no question that the exact same lawsuit could
be pursued by a private P&A system, and so even if Virginia did
not waive its immunity, the issue is whether there is a particular
affront to Virginia’s sovereignty to allow one of its officials to be
sued by one of its (admittedly independent) agencies. Moreover,
as noted above, it may be just as true that the state is present in
the lawsuit only on the plaintiff’s side, given the underlying
rationale behind Ex parte Young.
And in Sossamon, the question is whether RLUIPA should be
interpreted pursuant to ordinary principles of “waiver” and
notice, or whether Congress has to be “super clear” when seeking
to obtain waivers of state sovereign immunity—to specify not just
that the states will be liable for “appropriate relief,” but to
delineate the precise forms of relief that will be available. In
both cases, then, even if the specific conclusion doesn’t turn on
the central tenets of the Rehnquist Court’s state sovereign
immunity jurisprudence, we may learn quite a lot, indeed, about
the extent to which a concern for states’ rights tips the balance
away from established doctrine.
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To be sure, we may not learn these things, too. It is always a
thorny proposition to try to predict how the Court will dispose of
the cases on its docket, and Stewart and Sossamon are no
different in that regard. But given that the Supreme Court that
sits for the 2010 Term will have three Justices who have not yet
had the opportunity to speak to state sovereign immunity in any
meaningful fashion since joining the Court,158 and a fourth
Justice who only did so in a sui generis dissent, perhaps even the
absence of interesting discussion will provide revealing clues
going forward.
IV. CONCLUSION
There may be no area of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
in the past quarter-century that has generated such
simultaneously one-sided and full-throated academic disapproval
as the Court’s various forays into the sovereign immunity of the
states. I, for one, find much with which to agree in Justice
Stevens’s 1989 concurrence in Union Gas, where he observed
that there are really “two Eleventh Amendments.”159
He
explained “[t]here is first the correct and literal interpretation of
the plain language of the Eleventh Amendment that is fully
explained in JUSTICE BRENNAN’s dissenting opinion in
Second, Stevens
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon.”160
continued, “there is the defense of sovereign immunity that the
Court has added to the text of the Amendment in cases like Hans
v. Louisiana,”161 and, since Union Gas, Seminole Tribe, Coeur
d’Alene, Alden, and their offshoots. More succinctly, as Professor
John Manning has pointed out, “at least where the Constitution
158. As this essay went to print, the Court made clear that Justice Kagan
would not participate in Stewart, presumably because of her involvement as
Solicitor General in the government’s amicus brief in support of certiorari.
Although this development deprives observers of one chance to gain insight into
the views of the newest Justice, it may simultaneously raise the case’s stakes,
since the Petitioner will need to find two votes, in addition to the likely support
of Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, to reverse the Fourth Circuit.
159. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 23 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
160. Id.
161. Id.
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speaks in precise rule-like terms, as the Eleventh Amendment
does,” it is difficult to justify a “purposive,” rather than textual,
approach to its interpretation.162
But there is a critical distinction between going back on
decades of established case law (as many scholars repeatedly
urge the Court to do) and declining to expand it. And that is why
there may well be much to learn in how the Supreme Court
resolves the two state sovereign immunity cases on its docket for
the 2010 Term. Are the “special sovereignty interests” of the
states enough to justify an unprecedented exception to relief
under Ex parte Young, as Virginia is arguing for in Stewart, and
to require a super-clear statement from Congress when
subjecting states to liability in exchange for the recipient of
federal funds, as Texas claims they should in Sossamon?
Without question, we have already learned quite a lot about the
Roberts Court and its approach to the relationship between the
federal government and the states. What’s more, much of it has
represented a retreat, however slightly, from the federalism
jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court.163 But many of these
decisions have come in the context of Congress’s regulatory
power, a context in which there is necessarily less room for the
sovereignty concerns that pervaded the Rehnquist Court’s
approach in this area. As a result, how the Roberts Court
answers the questions presented in Stewart and Sossamon may
well tell us as much about the Court’s general approach to the
relationship between the states and the federal government
going forward as any case it has decided to date.

162. John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise
Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1670 (2004).
163. See, e.g., United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 2295
(2010).
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